Approximately 78% of China's electricity demand is met by burning coal, which has taken a serious toll on the environment. Hydropower represents a sustainable alternative source, and China already derives 16% of its electricity supply from hydropower. However, evidence from other hydroelectric projects such as the Three Gorges Dam suggests that the socioeconomic consequences of such large public works projects are enormous.
Introduction
China's electricity demand has increased dramatically in the last decade due to rapid growth in heavy industry and in personal consumption. Approximately 78% of this demand is currently met by coal burning, which has taken a serious toll on the environment: China is already the world's largest emitter of CO 2 , and the International Energy Agency predicts that the country will account for 40% of the growth of global annual CO 2 emission over the next 25 years.
Hydropower represents an alternative source of electricity that produces far fewer emissions, and China already derives more of its electricity from hydropower than virtually any other country.
Moreover, technological developments have made the exploitation of water resources in central and western regions economically viable. However, evidence from large dams such as the Three Gorges Dam suggests that the socioeconomic consequences of such large public works projects are enormous.
A series of dams has been proposed for the lower and middle reaches of the Nu River (Upper Salween) in western Yunnan Province. If completed, the 13-dam cascade would have greater power-generating capacity than the Three Gorges Dam and the entire Columbia River system (including the Grand Coulee, the largest dam in the US). However, the Nu is considered to be the last undammed river in China, 1 and many of the proposed dams are located in an area that has been declared a Conservation International Biodiversity Hotspot (Conservation International 2008) as well as a UNESCO World Heritage Site (UNESCO 2008) . Moreover, M A N U S C R I P T
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2 approximately 50,000 people -many of them ethnic minorities -would be forced to resettle by the resulting reservoirs (Yardley 2004) . Finally, the economic status of northwestern Yunnan is quite low, suggesting that socioeconomic vulnerabilities among the displaced population would be quite acute. Although construction has officially been halted pending impact assessments, geological substrata surveying has begun on at least five of the dams, and recent news reports indicate that the actual construction process has begun on one of these.
This paper begins by describing trends in China's electricity consumption and production, including the relative appeal of hydropower. We then describe the country's current hydroelectric development and prospects for further development, providing a detailed account of the proposed Nu River dams. We then describe the socioeconomic effects of population displacement from dam development, including changes in income and production, material well-being, social capacity, health outcomes, and access to cultural sites. We use welldocumented outcomes from the Three Gorges Dam as a case study to identify potential challenges associated with displacement in the Nu River area; although the two watersheds differ in many important ways, many of the challenges faced by displaced peoples are likely to be the same. Next, we provide a detailed economic profile of the Nu River area, arguing that poor farmers from disparate language groups are more likely to face extreme vulnerabilities in the resettlement process. Finally, we employ microevidence from interviews of affected households to demonstrate that the dam construction process in western Yunnan has been neither transparent nor consultative.
II. Electrical power generation in China
Growing Demand for Electricity
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Since the beginning of reforms in 1978, China's GDP has grown at approximately 9.5% per year (Chow 2001; Hao 2006) Although less important in the early stages of the reform period, China's heavy industry sector has become a major contributor to growth in the last five years as a result of higher industrial output prices, preferential tax policies, and relatively cheap electricity prices. Indeed, industry accounted for 71% of energy demand in China in 2005, compared to only 25% in the United States (Steenhof 2006; Rosen and Houser 2007) .
Rapid growth of personal incomes has coincided with the rapid growth of GDP, raising urban per capita incomes from 343 RMB in 1978 to 13,786 RMB in 2007 (National Bureau of Statistics 2007 . In rural areas, per capita income rose from 134 RMB to 4140 RMB over the same period (National Bureau of Statistics 2007). With higher personal incomes, ordinary
Chinese have found it easier to satisfy their food and shelter needs and are demanding more consumer goods such as televisions, air conditioners, refrigerators, and microwaves, all of which contribute to the increasing electricity demand in China (Smil 1998; Shen 2001; Yuan et al. 2007 ). The heavy subsidization of households' consumption of electricity (Rosen and Houser 2007) has also contributed to rising demand. However, the demand for electricity in China has not grown at a uniform pace across the country: coastal areas have benefited more from economic development than central and western regions (Figure 1 ), and the majority of the demand for electricity comes from these coastal provinces (Zhang 2004) .
Sources of Electricity Generation
China has long depended primarily on coal for electricity generation; International Energy Agency (2006) and Rosen and Houser (2007) report that up to 78% of the country's electricity supply is currently derived from coal-fired plants (Figure 2 ). Moreover, the country's total A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T As in other countries, China has converted most oil-fired power plants to other fuels due to concerns about relative inefficiency, pollutants, and uncertainty over the supply of petroleum.
Moreover, China's largest oil fields, Daqing and Shengli, produce oil that is relatively low in sulfur and high in API gravity, i.e., high-quality petroleum that is well-suited for gasoline production but that is generally considered inappropriate for electricity production given its high cost. In addition, the global price of oil has risen sharply in the last five years, making the prospect of producing electricity from oil uneconomical. As a result, less than 1% of China's electricity supply is currently derived from oil (International Energy Agency 2006). estimated increase of 15% per year in terms of natural gas demand, the country will likely run out of this resource before 2030. Attempts to secure supplies from neighboring Russia have been met with strong competition from Japan, and progress on the proposed Kovykta pipelines between Siberian gas fields and northeastern China has been slowed by stalled negotiations over pricing. China has recently secured rights to natural gas in the Shwe field, off the coast of Myanmar, and a pipeline to Kunming is expected to become operational by 2009. However, this pipeline will traverse difficult terrain, increasing the cost of the imported gas substantially.
Moreover, the isolation of the military junta may subject the gas supply coming out of Myanmar to volatility. This is because international opposition to the current regime may bring about UN and other forms of sanctions in the future, which will add political and logistical pressure for both China and Myanmar, making a constant gas supply hard to maintain. In addition to limited resources, China's existing pipelines for transporting natural gas are fragmented and concentrated mostly in Sichuan province, far from the major source of demand on the eastern seaboard (Energy Information Administration 2006). These factors contribute to the fact that less than 0.7% of electricity in China is currently generated by natural gas (Energy Information Administration 2007).
The Chinese government has also been actively pursuing nuclear power as an alternative supply of electricity. However, concerns about the transfer of sensitive technologies and profit sharing have resulted in negotiations with foreign suppliers being quite lengthy (Leventhal 1996; Rosen and Houser 2007) . Furthermore, the Chinese government is mindful that nuclear reactors are a potentially attractive target for terrorist attacks and that radioactive waste disposal incurs considerable environmental risk. For these reasons, China's expanding nuclear capability has failed to keep pace with electricity demand, and even if the ambitious plan of bringing one new
nuclear power plant online each year is realized, nuclear power will only contribute between 2.5 and 4.5 percent of China's electricity by 2020 (Energy Information Administration 2006).
Given the expense and the environmental and political implications of producing electricity from fossil fuels, natural gas, and nuclear power, hydropower provides an appealing alternative supply of electricity to meet China's growing demand. Furthermore, Pacca (2007) demonstrates that greenhouse gas emissions from hydropower (measured between 35 and 380 grams of CO 2 equivalent per kilowatt hour) are considerably below those for either natural gas (454g of CO 2 eq./kWh) and coal (890g of CO 2 eq./kWh). Indeed, Balat (2007) argues that large hydroelectric power plants and nuclear power plants are the only proven alternatives to coal, oil, and natural gas from an environmental sustainability perspective.
However, while nuclear power depends critically on imported technologies, China is fast becoming a producer of leading-edge technologies for generating electricity through hydropower.
For example, hydroelectric capacity in the Three Gorges Dam is being installed in three phases:
the first set of 14 turbines installed on the north side of the dam include just two that were produced domestically, while eight of the 12 generators now being installed on the south side of the dam are domestic; of the remaining six underground turbines, all are likely to be domestically produced (Peng 2007) . In addition, domestically-produced turbines are slated for installation in new hydropower plants along the Yangtze River and the Jinsha River (Yi 2005) , suggesting that China's technological capacity in hydroelectric generation is growing rapidly. China is also a leading producer of technologies for efficient electricity transmission over long distances. In
October 2007, China became the world leader in high-voltage direct current (DC) electricity transmission, with a total cable distance of 7,085 kilometers and total capacity of 18.36 million kilowatts (Jiang and Li 2007) . Relative to alternating current (AC) cables, these DC cables
reduce line losses over long-distance transmissions and eliminate the need for substations that periodically compensate for line losses by boosting the line voltage (Jiang and Li 2007) .
Moreover, they are more flexible and comparatively inexpensive to produce. These technologies make supplying China's eastern seaboard with power generated from central and western China's rivers economically feasible.
To be sure, large-scale hydropower does present certain risks and disadvantages, and many have questioned the merits of mega-dams in China and elsewhere around the world (e.g., 
III. Hydroelectric power development in China
China has the greatest hydropower potential of any country on Earth, with an estimated total capacity of approximately 380,000 megawatts (MW) (Cheng 1999 MW while a series of dams slated for construction upstream on the Jinsha River will have a total capacity of 38,500 MW. For perspective, the second-largest dam in the world is the Itaipu dam on the Brazil/Paraguay border, with a total capacity of 14,000 MW. The Grand Coulee with 6,809 MW of generating capacity is the largest dam in the U.S., and the entire Columbia River 4 We use the term "base" (jidi) in keeping with the Chinese usage. Although some of the "bases" identified in the nationwide hydropower survey are contiguous with "basins" (watersheds, or liuyu), this is not necessarily the case. For the purposes of this paper, "basin" refers to the watershed or drainage basin of a particular river. 5 The International Commission on Large Dams (1994) defines dams exceeding 15 meters in height as "large."
basin has a total installed capacity of 24,140 MW. Hydropower development in China is thus quite advanced, providing approximately 16% of China's total electricity supply (Rosen and Houser 2007) , making it the second largest source of electricity behind coal.
Figure 3 depicts the total capacity for each of the 12 large hydropower bases identified in 1989 and Table 3 shows the status of each of the high-capacity dams (which we define a having at least 1,000 MW of generating power) planned for these river systems. The Jinsha River has a potential generating capacity of 47,890 MW (Figure 3 ), including the Xiluodu dam and Baihetan dam, China's second and third largest at 12,600 MW and 12,000 MW, respectively ( Table 1 ). Fujian, the remaining 21 dams in this system are well below 1,000 MW. The Nanpan River and Hongshui River hydropower base has a total potential capacity of 12,520 MW, including five high-capacity dams, two of which are already completed. The Northeastern watershed includes Prior to the mid-1980s, resettlement in China was conceived of as being a single event focusing on compensation. In the absence of generating buy-in from relocatees ex-ante mobilization and providing opportunities for economic development ex-post, resettlement often led to lower socioeconomic conditions (Dai 1989; Chau 1995) . 9 With the encouragement of the World Bank, however, the resettlement paradigm shifted to a longer-term process coupling compensation with "mobilization" and economic development in the mid-1980s (Webber and McDonald 2004) , and most commentators concur that socioeconomic vulnerabilities in the face of involuntary resettlement are greatly reduced (World Bank 1994). Nevertheless, the social and economic consequences of large dam development remain substantial, 10 and to illustrate this point explicitly, we briefly review evidence from the Three Gorges Dam.
IV. Socioeconomic vulnerabilities associated with dam development
The Three Gorges Dam
The Three Gorges Dam had been in conception for 75 years before groundbreaking in 1993.
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When completed in 2009, the dam will be the biggest hydropower station in the world, with a total capacity of 18,200 MW (Yao 2006 clearing land or terracing on hills with slopes exceeding 25 o to prevent landslides around the reservoir. As a result, at least 40% of the displaced people will be resettled into urban areas (Jackson and Sleigh 2000) where they face mortgage payments (Jen 2004) . Because average education in rural areas is well below that in urban areas (Brown and Park 2002) , resettled people will face a distinct disadvantage in competing for employment. Moreover, the job tenure of resettled populations is often short: evidence from Yichang county shows that 60% of the first migrant workers from the dam area had been laid-off within one year (Li 2000) . Meanwhile, farmers who are provided with new land to farm are likely to see reductions in income because the most fertile land in the area has been inundated. As a result, incomes of resettled peoples may fall, regardless of where they are resettled.
Food insecurity is a further concern among farmers who have been resettled. Losses of 28,000 hectares of rice fields (Jackson and Sleigh 2000) imply an annual grain shortage of 120,000 tons each year (China Yangtze Three Gorges Project Development Corporation 1994).
Moreover, although many farmers have been encouraged to cultivate citrus and tea, it will likely take time for rice farmers to develop expertise in these crops (Ponseti and Pujol 2006) .
Concerns about community disarticulation are especially pronounced because many rural
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Chinese closely identify with a village clan (shi), and given that over 1,300 villages, 140 towns, and 13 cities will be inundated (Dai 1989) , it has proven impossible to resettle whole communities intact (Lovell 2005) . Moreover, resettlement often causes resentment in host communities because the resettled people are allocated land that once belonged to locals and because resettlement puts upward pressure on social services (Qiu, Wu, and Du 2000) . In addition, displaced peoples often benefit from tax holidays and living subsidies, causing resentment among host populations (Hegelund 2006) . Indeed, Li, Waley, and Rees (2001) find that one-third of people in host communities resented the resettled populations.
In terms of health outcomes, both schistosomiasis and malaria are likely to see a resurgence as the rapidly-flowing Yangtze becomes a stagnant reservoir (Zwinger 1997) . Few health programs have been established to address these potential problems, and many have voiced concerns that few resources will be available to address health threats after completion of the project (Salazar 2000) . Higher rates of clinical depression and suicide will likely also accompany dam construction as farmers are moved off the land (Sleigh 2006) .
Finally, at least 1,282 cultural sites, including ancient cities, ancestral temples, graves, and prehistoric sites have been inundated (Ponseti and Pujol 2006) . For example, the 3000-yearold hanging coffins in the Shen Na Gorge have largely been submerged, and many of the vistas made famous in Li Bai's poetry are unlikely to ever be seen again. The cultural loss is thus considerable, if immeasurable.
V. Damming the Nu River
Poverty and vulnerability in western Yunnan
After entering northwestern Yunnan Province from the Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, the Nu
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River flows through a steep gorge that transects three counties in Nujiang Lisu Autonomous Prefecture. Slopes are precipitous and farming is extremely difficult along the river banks.
Nevertheless, well over 90% of the workforce in Gongshan, Fugong, and Lushui Counties is engaged in agriculture for its livelihood (Table 3) 
Microdata evidence from the Nu River Valley
As shown in the previous section, the areas through which the Nu River flows are poorer, more agricultural, more dependent on government subsidies, and more ethnically fragmented than many other areas affected by dam construction. By contrast, the incomes and livelihoods of people affected by the Three Gorges Dam are broadly reflective of China as a whole, and the vast majority of the displaced people are ethnically Han. Given the reductions in income and productivity, material well-being, social capacity, and health and the loss of sites of cultural significance resulting from the Three Gorges Dam, vulnerabilities may be even more acute in the Nu River area.
Unfortunately, no formal social surveys of these populations have been undertaken, so it is difficult to evaluate the likely impact of the 13 dams on the Nu River. However, a group of journalists from the Beijing-based NGO Green Home conducted a number of interviews in the Nu River region in 2006 with the purpose of better understanding the dam projects, the environmental impacts, the economic costs and benefits of dam construction, and the concerns of the local residents regarding the Nu River cascade. The transcripts of 94 of these interviews were provided for the purposes of this research; among the interviewees, 64% were male, 53%
were ethnic Lisu, and 76% had six or fewer years of education (including 34% who had never
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19 attended school). Although the sample is small and the interviews were non-scientific, these interviews nevertheless provide suggestive evidence of the consultation and relocation processes.
More than three-fourths of the interviewees had heard about the possible relocation of their villages if the hydroelectric power plants were to be built (Table 4) . However, only 16%
had learned about the possible relocation by official government sources, and only a handful of these had been told where they would be resettled. Only one interviewee reported that the government had discussed the environmental impact assessment process with him, suggesting that local governments are not publicizing the process or consulting with affected peoples. These findings demonstrate a lack of transparency on part of the government, which may contribute to uncertainty and mistrust of the resettlement process.
Nearly nine in ten interviewees who were asked reported that their property had been measured by the government, although many of these were not told why their property was being measured. Moreover, only 9% considered the measurement methods to be fair, while many others complained that the government refused to count terraced fields or outbuildings such as sheds, barns, and toilets. These findings suggest that displaced people are unlikely to be satisfied with the compensation offered by the government should relocation occur.
The interviews also revealed considerable mistrust of the government stemming from past experience. For example, 93% of interviewees reported having had land confiscated by the government for the development of public infrastructure, but only 46% reported being offered any form of compensation. Among this latter group, only 50% believed that the compensation was fair. Such mistrust has contributed to widespread concern among the locals regarding the likely resettlement process, with 77% of interviewees reporting being concerned about their lives if they were to be resettled. Moreover, while 80% of interviewees expressed a willingness to be
20 relocated conditional on receiving fair compensation, only 11% of the total was willing to be relocated outside of their home villages.
Overall, attitudes of interviewees toward possible dam construction were negative. Only 43% supported damming the Nu River in general while just one-third believed the dams would benefit their villages economically. Moreover, a significant share of interviewees reported that they felt pressure from the government to agree to resettlement should the dams be built.
VI. Conclusion
China's consumption of electricity is rising concurrently with its wealth, fueled not only by a growing industrial sector but also by rising consumer demand. Shanghai's real per capita GDP has already surpassed that of 1960s Japan, and incomes in Beijing, Tianjin, and other provinces and municipalities are also rising quickly. Although China enjoys both a large supply of coal and expertise in converting coal into electricity, the government has recognized the problem of CO 2 emissions associated with coal burning and has moved to identify environmentally sustainable alternatives to coal-fired power plants. Hydropower is central to this strategy, and China already derives more of its electricity from hydropower than either the US or Europe as a whole.
With a total exploitable capacity of some 380,000 MW, China is currently in the process of fulfilling a plan to develop dams in on rivers in 12 hydropower bases around the country . If Prefecture belong to ethnic minority groups, many of which are very small. Not surprisingly, these groups frequently lack reliable access both to information regarding alternative development models and to the decision processes through large hydraulic infrastructure projects
People in the Nu River area may thus be especially vulnerable to the negative consequences of dam construction, so it is especially important for the associated dam development processes to be transparent and, to the greatest extent possible, consultative.
Unfortunately, evidence from interviews conducted in 2006 indicates that decisions about the Nu River dams have been neither. For example, only 16% of interviewees had been told of possible relocation by official government sources, and only one interviewee was aware that the government was responsible for undertaking an environmental impact assessment prior to dam construction. Similarly, while most of the interviewees reported having had their land measured, only 9% considered the measurement to be accurate, and fewer than one-quarter who had had land confiscated in the past considered the compensation to be fair. As such, interviewees are mistrustful of the government: few support damming the Nu River, and fewer still are willing to be relocated to another village should the dams be constructed. In addition, the Nu River flows from Yunnan into Myanmar, where tens of thousands of people -many of whom are ethnic minorities already facing repression and socioeconomic difficulties under the military regimedepend on the river to provide water and nutrients to their fields.
Equally important, the Nu River area is environmentally sensitive. For example, many of the proposed dams are located in an area that has been declared a Conservation International Biodiversity Hotspot and a UNESCO World Heritage Site. While the area is in many places far from pristine -logging, steep-slope farming, and mining have all taken their toll -it is nevertheless an important repository of biological diversity in China and the world. Indeed, according to UNESCO (2008) , northwest Yunnan has the greatest biodiversity in China and is among the most biologically diverse temperate regions on Earth. Finally, although there remains disagreement over whether or not the filling of the Three Gorges reservoir was a factor in the May 2008 earthquake in Sichuan's Wenquan County, reservoir-induced seismicity has been documented in China and elsewhere (Talwani 1997) , and western Yunnan has a history of seismic activity.
Energy bureaucrats and power company representatives in China are quick to associate high levels of hydropower exploitation with economic development, and it would be presumptuous to suggest that China should restrict its economic development aspirations. It is our hope, however, that effort be expended to maximize end-use energy efficiency gains, while at the same time increasing the transparency and inclusiveness of decision-making processes regarding new energy projects. In particular, with a fragile economy and a diversity of threatened cultures and species along an ecologically sensitive trans-boundary river, a careful and determined social and environmental impact assessment should be undertaken prior to construction of the Nu hydropower projects. Making the results of such an assessment publicly available would help to alleviate concerns and to identify alternatives, although we recognize that Chinese government policy prevents the sharing of certain hydrological data on transboundary rivers due to national security consideration. In the meantime, China has already committed to constructing 39 additional high-capacity dams in the 12 hydropower bases marked for development in 1989, many of which are likely to have moderate effects on local populations.
With approximately two-thirds of the hydroelectric potential from these 12 bases still unexploited, China's immediate energy policy does not depend on the Nu River. S h a n g h a i B e ij i n g T ia n ji n Z h e j ia n g J ia n g s u G u a n g d o n g H e n a n S h a a n x i G u a n g x i S i c h u a n Y u n n a n G a n s u Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2006) and Yunnan Bureau of Statistics (2006) A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T The dam will be economically beneficial for my village 33% 67% My land has been seized by the government before for the construction of public infrastructure 93% 7%
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Compensation was provided to me for previous confiscations 46% 54% I think the compensation was fair 50% 50% I receive subsidy from the government 64% 36% Source: Green Home (2006) 
